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EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS 
ARETO A. IMOUKHUEDE 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues for a human dignity-based, due process clause analysis to recognize 
the fundamental duty of government to provide high quality, public education.  Access to public 
education is a fundamental duty, or positive fundamental right because education is a basic 
human need and a constituent part of all democratic rights.   
In The Fifth Freedom, I argued that there is a fundamental duty under the U.S. 
Constitution to provide public education and that the reason a fundamental right to public 
education has not been recognized is because of a profound confusion regarding fundamental 
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rights as duties.1  The Court is biased towards protecting negative rights or liberties over 
enforcing positive rights or duties.2  As a result, the Court has failed to develop a framework for 
protecting even the most basic and widely accepted of fundamental duties, the constitutional duty 
to provide high quality, public education.3  
Here, I demonstrate that education is essential to any meaningful concept of personal 
liberty and to democracy.  Without an educated citizenry, liberty and democracy are merely 
empty concepts devoid of meaning for all but the economically privileged and socially 
advantaged.  For instance, voter turnout is much lower amongst people with no college 
educations as compared to people with college and graduate level degrees.4  The voter turnout 
                                                 
 
 1.  Id. at 87.  
2.  See id. at 81; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). 
3.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“Education . . .  is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so 
protected.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated 
as a suspect class because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a 
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need not justify by 
compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided to its 
population.”). 
4.  See, e.g., Aina Gallego, Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in 
Comparative Perspective, 29 ELECTORAL STUD. 239, 240 (2010) (discussing findings that well-
educated citizens vote more frequently than the poorly educated in some countries, including the 
  
for adults who have not completed high school is even lower.5  Hence, it is well understood that 
education inspires and enables meaningful democratic engagement.6 
Recognizing that public education is a basic capability that is essential to human dignity 
requires application of a due process clause analysis similar to that applied in the recent human 
dignity-based holding of Lawrence v. Texas.7  Ironically, Lawrence, which is a negative-rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
United States); Barry C. Burden, The Dynamic Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 28 
ELECTORAL STUD. 540 (2009) (analyzing survey data from 1952 to 2004, showing that the effect 
of college education increased starting in 1980s, thereby magnifying the ability of educational 
attainment to predict turnout). 
 5.  Rachel Milstein Sondheimer & Donald P. Green, Using Experiments to Estimate the 
Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 174-179 (2009) (arguing that there is 
a powerful relationship between education and voter turnout  and pointing out that political 
participation is the function of one’s level of education; people with mere high school education 
or less are less likely to vote). 
6.  See Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. 
REV. 261, 262 (2005) (arguing that autonomy as a constitutional value was always implied in 
many fundamental rights, but neglected in voting specially when the political autonomy to vote 
of the minorities and that minority voters must experience for themselves the value of 
autonomy). 
7.  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that the Texas statute which made it a crime for people 
of the same sex to engage in sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to males who 
engaged in these same sex sexual activities in the privacy of their own homes). 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS, 47 Ind. L. Rev. __ (Forthcoming 2014). 
 
and liberty-based holding, can serve as the template for recognizing the positive right of access 
to public education.8  While the basic right recognized in Lawrence is the right to privacy, free of 
government intrusion, Lawrence rests on a broader notion of substantive due process: that 
privacy is essential to liberty and human dignity.9  Like the right to privacy, education is also 
essential to liberty.   However, the case for a dignity-based due process clause protection of the 
right to public education is even stronger for education than the case for the right to privacy.   
This is because education is essential to both the liberty and the democracy components of 
human dignity.10      
This Article begins in Part I by discussing the nature of the U.S. “national education 
crisis”11 and reasons that improving public education across the U.S would help advance 
innovation and the nation’s long term gross domestic product.  I then discuss empirical research 
that demonstrates that educational inequality based on race, ethnicity, and wealth has only 
become worse.12  Race and socioeconomic educational inequality comparisons between the U.S. 
and Canada demonstrate that the way things are with regard to U.S. educational inequity is not 
                                                 
 
8.  Id.  
9.  Id.  
10.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 301-302 (arguing that autonomy as a constitutional value 
was always implied in many fundamental rights, but neglected in voting especially when the 
political autonomy to vote of the minorities and that minority voters must experience for 
themselves the value of autonomy). 
1111 Insert infra note to third footnote in Part I where I references “a national education 
crisis.” 
12 Insert infra note to my citation in Part I to Darling Hammond’s “Soaring Systems” article. 
  
the way things have to be or have to remain.  The section closes with the Deweyan insight that in 
addition to affecting economic prosperity, education also impacts the capability of citizens to 
fully and meaningfully engage in the political process.13 
Part II demonstrates that equal and fair access to high quality education is essential to 
democracy and human dignity.  This Part argues with the support of classical, enlightenment, 
and modern philosophers such as Aristotle,14 Jacques Rousseau,15 and John Dewey,16 that a well-
educated citizenry is essential to democracy.  This Part connects concepts of liberty with the 
capabilities approach as applied by Amartya Sen17 and Martha Nussbaum.18  This approach 
                                                 
 
13 Insert infra note to the footnote in Part I referencing Dewey’s DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION. Please change the reference to EDUCATION IN THE US into a “see also” and 
add to the see also list MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (Harvard Univ. Press 2011) 
and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011). 
14.  ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 229 (Carnes Lord trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984) 
(“Since there is a single end for the city as a whole, it is evident that education must necessarily 
be one and the same for all . . . .”). 
15.  See, e.g., DEMOCRACY: A READER 100 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 
2000) See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, 11-15 
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1968) ((Rousseau explains that “through the social contract we gain civil 
liberty and moral liberty: the former involves being ruled by a general will instead of our 
individual self-interest.  The latter means obedience to rules which we, in association with our 
fellow citizens, have made.”)  
16.  See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 4 (Free Press 1966) (1916).    
17.  See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144 (1999).   
18.  See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
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supports protecting basic capabilities that enhance freedom; including the capability to be 
educated.19  The capabilities approach treats education as important to economic and political 
participation.20  Based on this capabilities based analysis, Part II concludes that being educated is 
essential to liberty, democracy, and human dignity.21   
Part III explains how modern Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has retreated from 
its early equality aspirations as it has continued to embrace an increasingly libertarian 
perspective.22  This Part begins by discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s early proclamations 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
APPROACH 32-33 (Belknap Press 2011).  Among Nussbaum’s brief list of ten centrally important 
capabilities is the capability for “Senses, Imagination, and Thought.”  Id. at 33.  Nussbaum 
explains that the capability to think and reason in a “truly human” way requires an adequate 
education.  Id. 
19.  See, e.g., id. 
20.  See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231-35, 275-76, 283, 291-96, 300, 304 
(Belknap Press 2011).  Sen first discusses the link between economic wealth and substantive 
freedoms; for example, while there is a link between higher income and “freedom from 
premature mortality,” other factors come into play including public healthcare, access to medical 
care, access to education, and social unity.    
21 Id. at 226-27. 
22.  See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 28, 55–57, 83 (2004).  See also Jamie B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Radical 
Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 525–29 (1995) (arguing that the political gains made by African 
  
regarding the importance of education and how the Warren Court overcame problematic liberal 
theories of equality that had previously been used to justify “separate but equal” in education and 
other contexts.23  Part III concludes by recognizing that the modern Court has abandoned 
equality as a viable principle of justice, in favor of a liberty-centered jurisprudence that ignores 
the equality principle.24     
Part IV prescribes an alternative approach for recognizing and protecting a right to public 
education based in a due process clause analysis.  Such an approach would allow education 
rights advocates to overcome the Equal Protection Clause limitations described in Part III.25  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Americans and other minorities during the Civil Rights era and under the Warren Court have 
been reduced by the current conservative Court); Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1201–02 (2000) (arguing that the Court has made it clear that equality is 
not a factor to observing Eighth Amendment challenges). 
23.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24.  See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence Of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 
(2011).  Henry explores and expands the concept of dignity in the U.S. Constitutional Law 
context and makes three important findings.  First, the Court’s reliance on dignity is increasing, 
and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend.  Second, in contrast to its past use, dignity is 
now as likely to be invoked by the more conservative Justices on the Court as by their more 
liberal counterparts.  Finally, the study demonstrates that dignity is not one concept, as other 
scholars have theorized, but rather five related concepts.  
25.  See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011).  
Kenji Yoshino connects liberty and equality through a concept of human dignity and suggests 
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Part IV critiques Kenji Yoshino’s “pluralism anxiety” and argues for applying the more accurate 
label of “xenophobia” to describe the societal pressures animating the Court’s abandonment of 
equality.  Despite this critique of Yoshino’s pluralism anxiety label, this part embraces 
Yoshino’s central argument that a due process clause-based human dignity approach to 
recognizing constitutional duties is more likely to achieve success, because the Court appears to 
have already applied human dignity as a proxy for other rights, most recently when examining 
privacy rights in Lawrence v. Texas.26    
I. THE NATURE OF THE EDUCATION PROBLEM 
Ensuring that every child in the U.S. at least receives a high quality primary and 
secondary school education is obviously important in our increasingly complex, global society.27 
[A]ccess to an equitable, empowering education for all people has become a 
critical issue for the American nation as a whole. No society can thrive in a 
technological, knowledge-based economy by depriving large segments of its 
population of learning. But at a time when three-quarters of the fastest-growing 
occupations require post-secondary education, just over one-third of our young 
people receive a college degree. Meanwhile, in many European and Asian nations, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
that a liberty-centered human dignity approach that derives respect and equal dignity for all is 
more likely to achieve litigation success than an equality based approach.    
26.  Id. at 776-796 (using Lawrence v. Texas as an example of the liberty-based dignity 
claim).  
27.  See Linda Darling-Hammond, Soaring Systems: High Flyers All Have Equitable 
Funding, Shared Curriculum, and Quality Teaching, AM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2010-2011, 
http://www.aft.org/pdfs/americaneducator/winter1011/DarlingHammond.pdf. 
  
more than half of young people are becoming college graduates.28  
 
Despite this need for what Darling-Hammond frames as an “equitable and empowering 
education,” the U.S. is in the midst of what some, including myself, have characterized as “a 
national education crisis.”29  Fear of lagging economic growth lies at the heart of many current 
political and economic debates both in the U.S. and across the world.30  Economists recognize 
high quality education can aid in enhancing innovation, thereby advancing a nation’s long term 
                                                 
 
28.  Id. at 19. 
29.  Regina Ramsey James, How to Mend a Broken Act:  Recapturing Those Left Behind 
By No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683, 694–97 (2010) (“Millions of children in our 
nation’s public education system are still not receiving the fair, equal, and significant opportunity 
for a high-quality education”); Dennis J. Condron & Vincent J. Roscigno, Disparities Within:  
Unequal Spending and Achievement in an Urban School District, 76 SOC. OF EDUC. 1, 20 (2003) 
(“[R]acial and class inequality in school funding illustrate[s] these realities in the contemporary 
era, showing how being of a minority or poor social-class is often synonymous with attending a 
school that is dilapidated, overcrowded, unsafe, and unhealthy”); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 
49-50. 
30.   Economic Crisis and Market Upheavals, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/ (summarizing the 
chronology of the current economic crisis, from housing bubble to credit crunch and financial 
crisis) (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).  See also James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global 
Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. OF 
ECON.. 563 (2012) (arguing that the current financial crisis is the result of deregulation, financial 
innovation, a variety of booms and bust, and the structural flaws of the financial system).  
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gross domestic product.31  Thus, improving public education across the U.S. can be a real factor 
in advancing our nation’s long term gross domestic product.32  The simple recognition that high 
quality public education positively effects long term economic growth should by itself be more 
than sufficient reason for our nation to take seriously the current national education crisis in 
order to ensure our nation’s prosperity for posterity.33  
                                                 
 
31.  See Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 74 (citing Philip Stevens & Martin Weale, 
Education and Economic Growth, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
EDUCATION 164, 164-167 (Geraint Johnes ed., 2004) (construing a formula regarding economic 
prosperity and quality of education in democratic society))  
Ln GDP per Capita = 0.35 in enrollment rate + 5.23 
“According to Stevens and Weale’s theory, increased investments in education ultimately 
increase innovation, which in the long term increases a nation’s GDP.” 
32.  Id.  
33.  Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the 
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2007).  Rebell argues:  
Through state standards-based education reform initiatives and the Federal 
No Child Left Behind Act, the United States has made an unprecedented and 
extraordinary commitment to ensuring that all children will meet challenging 
academic proficiency standards. To date, however, little progress has been made 
toward meeting this ambitious mandate, largely because state and federal 
educational policies fail to deal with the enormous impediments to learning that 
are posed by the conditions of poverty in which millions of school children live. 
 
Id. at 1467.  See also Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the 
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 339 (2010) (“In order for present-day students to 
  
Irrespective of the overall or average adequacy of the U.S. education system, one point 
that is not in serious debate is the woeful race and wealth-based inequities in public education.34  
Sadly, Julius Chambers’ statement regarding race, poverty and education is as true today as it 
was back in 1987: 
In America. . . the quality and quantity of education that children receive 
remain tied to the race and economic status of their family.  Many black and poor 
children, through no fault of their own, continue to be deprived of training in even 
the most basic skills, such as reading, writing and arithmetic.  This deprivation 
works a profound and lifelong injury to these neglected youths, and cripples their 
ability to participate in political and economic life.  
. . . .   
The United States is often romantically portrayed as a meritocracy.  Yet, 
the continuing poverty of a disproportionate number of black children, their 
increasing isolation in largely segregated school systems, and the resistance of 
white citizens both to full integration and to adequate funding of all school 
districts, have perpetuated a system in which the potential achievement of a child 
is highly correlated with the race and economic status of his parents.35  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
compete in this rapidly growing technological environment, our public education system may 
require a reconfiguration of both the curriculum and the delivery system to prepare our students 
for a promising future in the Information Age.  This will require new thinking about the entire 
public policy dimension of public education at the national and state levels.”). 
34.  See Linda Darling-Hammond, Restoring Our Schools: The Quest for Equity in the 
United States, 51 EDUC. CANADA, no. 5, 2011, at 14.  See also Julius Chambers, Adequate 
Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 55-58 (1987) 
(arguing that racial and economic inequality lead to inequality in opportunity to adequate 
education and to make matters worse, racial and economic inequality are tied, thus minorities are 
prone to inadequate education.); Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19. 
35.  Chambers, supra note 31, at 55-56. 
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More recently, education scholar, Linda Darling-Hammond’s research demonstrates that 
if anything, the racial inequities in education have only worsened.36 
In 2011, the four-year high school graduation rate remains stagnant at 
about 70 percent; the achievement gap between minority and White students in 
reading and math is larger than it was in 1988; and U.S. performance on 
international tests has continued to drop… 
. . . . 
. . . In the U.S., the impact of socio-economic factors on student 
performance is almost double what it is in Canada. . . . . In the U.S., White and 
Asian students score just above the average for the European OECD nations in 
each subject area, but African-American and Hispanic students – many of whom 
are in highly segregated schools that lack qualified teachers and up-to-date 
materials – score so much lower that the national average plummets to the bottom 
tier.  Thus, the poor U.S. standing is substantially a product of unequal access to 
the kind of intellectually challenging learning measured on these international 
assessments.37 
 
Darling-Hammond’s research demonstrates that many empirical studies regarding the overall or 
average quality of American education frequently overlook the abysmal quality of education the 
U.S. education system affords most racial and ethnic minorities and impoverished children.38  
Darling-Hammond’s socioeconomic and racial comparisons between the U.S. educational 
system and Canada’s, indicates that the way things are in the U.S. is not the way things have to 
be or have to remain.  However, the notion of a U.S. education system is itself a bit of a 
misnomer.  Under current Constitutional law doctrine, the federal government can only play a 
limited role in public education and therefore, the individual states are primarily involved in 
                                                 
 
36.  Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19. 
37.  Id.  
38.  Id. 
 
  
creating and ensuring the quality of their own state and local public education systems.39  The 
federal government’s role in public education is limited largely to its constitutional power to tax 
and spend for the general welfare under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.40  
However if this power were coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
based duty of government to protect equal access to publicly provided services, ought to provide 
sufficient legal protection of the right of poor and minority children to receive at least the same 
quality of public education as their more privileged peers.  However, as to the issues of economic 
privilege, current constitutional law doctrine fails to recognize wealth as a category of 
                                                 
 
39.  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974) (discussing that “no single 
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of 
schools).  See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973) (stating 
that “the Texas system . . . should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature 
of the State’s efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution . . . [l]ocal 
control is not only vital to continued public support of the school, but it is of overriding 
importance from an educational standpoint as well.”); Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-
30 (N.Y. 2003) (discussing how education has, and should always remain in, local control).  
40.  U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and 
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States.”). 
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discrimination that would invoke meaningful constitutional law protection.41  As to race and 
ethnicity, the U.S. Supreme Court, has largely retreated from its earlier mid-twentieth century 
integrationist and equality aspirations for protecting equal access to public education.42   
The quality of education affects more than economic prosperity, it also impacts the 
capability of citizens to fully and meaningfully engage in the political process.43 This 
                                                 
 
41.  ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: 
ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 14 (2003); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 85; Brenna Bridget 
Mahoney, Children at Risk: The Inequality of Urban Education, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.  
161, 169 (1991). 
42.  Eric P. Christofferson, Note, Rodriguez Reexamined: The Misnomer of “Local 
Control” and a Constitutional Case for Equitable Public School Funding, 90 GEO. L.J. 2553, 
2553-55 (2002) (“[d]isparities in the quality of education from one school district to the next are 
both real and considerable.”); Darling-Hammond, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the quality of 
education in predominantly poor and minority communities; the inequity of results and the 
inequity of quality of teachers); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 49; Mahoney, supra note 38, at 
162.   
43.  Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779), in 
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 739-40 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974) 
[hereinafter EDUCATION IN THE U.S]; DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4.  
Editors, please change the reference to EDUCATION IN THE US into a “see also” and 
add to the see also list MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (Harvard Univ. Press 2011) 
  
connection between democracy and education has been recognized since the founding and has 
continued to be recognized since that time. 
Thomas Jefferson and his fellow founding fathers wrote official 
declarations and papers that espoused a civic philosophy that public education is 
essential to a democracy.  They espoused normative arguments favoring public 
education that have continued to be articulated by more contemporary educational 
philosophers like John Dewey.44 
 
In American democracy, “we the people” are not ruled, but rather we actively participate in 
deciding who will be elected to serve us by electing individuals who we believe will further our 
interests.   
Absent the capability of citizens to comprehend the issues and thereby make informed 
choices as to how best to further the public good, American democracy may begin to lose its 
democratic character.45  Our republic will begin to look more like an aristocracy run exclusively 
by those with sufficient wealth or other privilege to attain a largely unattainable quality of 
education.  Those few will effectively rule over a populace of largely uneducated people, 
incapable of meaningfully evaluating the performance of those they have technically “elected,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
and AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011). 
44.  Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 60.  See also Jefferson, EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra 
note 40, at 739-40; DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4. 
45.  See DEWEY, supra note 14, at 8, (NU Vision Publication 2009) (1916); Imoukhuede, 
supra note 1, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, at 63 (“Formal education has become 
increasingly important as the scope of resources, achievements, and responsibilities in society 
has grown more complex. No longer can children get by with a mere three years of formal basic 
education and from there go on to apprentice themselves to adults.”). 
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but who have actually been selected through a process that few understand.46  Such a failure of 
education would diminish our grand republic into a form of aristocratic demagoguery that would 
be less institutionally accountable or limited than a straightforward aristocracy.47  The highly 
regarded education philosopher, John Dewey, believed: 
[T]he aim of education [is] to help in correcting unfair privilege and deprivation, 
not to help perpetuate them . . . .  [T]he school becomes the chief means for the 
reform of society toward a better condition. . . . Yet education is not limited to the 
school.48  
Dewey believed education to be a lifelong process:  “Education is continuous travel through life 
in which the only arrival to speak of is death.”49  This insight underscores education’s value to 
democracy and its role in avoiding a descent into an undemocratic aristocracy or plutocracy. 
Education is the ultimate access point to opportunity.50  Many in the U.S. believe that all 
                                                 
 
46.  See generally ANNE MICHAELS EDWARDS, EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS POLITICAL 
THEORY 81-96 (Avebury 1996) (summarizing John Dewey’s educational and political theories); 
JOHN DEWEY, MY PEDAGOGIC CREED 430 (Nabu Press 2010) – I didn’t get this idea directly from 
Dewey, but from Edward’s reference to him. Please cite this in a way give Edwards the 
appropriate attribution for the framing of the summary.  
47.  Id. at 85-87. 
48.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 87. 
49.  Id. at 95. 
50.  SEN, supra note 15, at 39 (“[P]olitical participation may be hindered by the inability 
to read newspapers or to communicate in writing with others involved in political activities.”); 
JOHN M ALEXANDER , CAPABILITIES AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
  
should have an equal opportunity to obtain the basic skills necessary to succeed in life, even if 
there is disagreement as to what those basic skills might include before some demonstration of 
merit becomes necessary in order to be entitled to further education.51  There is significant 
support for the modern need for higher education, here defined as any education after the twelfth 
grade.52  This Article is focused on a matter of which there is even less dispute; the necessity for 
providing access to high quality, primary and secondary education as a vehicle for providing the 
equal opportunity that today’s concept of  human dignity requires.53    
 
II. EDUCATION IS ESSENTIAL TO DIGNITY 
Dignity is fundamental to modern concepts of justice, and education is essential to human 
dignity.54  Human dignity has been referenced by American judges with increasing frequency 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
AMARTYA SEN AND MARTHA NUSSBAUM 126 (2008) (“[T]he political community needs to 
provide both the required level of material resources, education and social conditions for the 
pursuit of the good life.”). 
51.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 126.  See also Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality 
In Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2090 (2006). 
52 Reference regarding higher education needed. 
53.  “Education,” unless specifically stated otherwise, refers in this Article to primary and 
secondary education, which is the focus of this Article.  Focusing on primary and secondary 
education is not intended at all to indicate that higher education does not bring to bear similar 
concerns and implicate a similar duty under the U.S. Constitution. 
 54.  BETTY A. REARDON, EDUCATING FOR HUMAN DIGNITY 5-7 (1995). [PLEASE SEND 
PDF] 
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since World War II.55  According to Leslie Meltzer Henry, there has been a resurgence of human 
dignity-based decision making in the current Roberts Court.56  Human dignity has now become 
the basis for much of international human rights law.57  Dignity was seen by Immanuel Kant as 
flowing from the uniquely human consciousness and the ability to discern, make laws and 
thereby shape reality.58  For Kant, dignity was something every human being had, simply by 
virtue of being human.59  
The modern view that dignity is fundamental to justice and that education is essential to 
human dignity was shared by the late American education philosopher and psychologist, John 
Dewey, who famously believed in an education-centered concept of meliorism.60  Dewey 
                                                 
 
55.  Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 169 n. 
17-26 (2011). Please insert the footnote’s references here. 
56.  Id. at 169-173. 
57.  SEN, SUPRA NOTE 18, AT 226-27. 
58.  IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 42-43 (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) 
59.  Id.   Kant argued that dignity is an end in itself.  It does not have an instrumental 
value, which has relative price or worth but rather dignity is an inner worth—something that is 
intrinsically endowed on any rational and autonomous individual. 
60.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 70 (discussing the process of progression that fulfills the 
needs of the existing community and improves the existing life so that the future will be better 
than the past); DEWEY, supra note 14, at 61-105 (arguing for the process of progress in society as 
  
believed that the world can be improved through human action and that human action can be 
inspired and improved through education.61  He criticized popular approaches to education as 
creating followers and conformists rather than leaders and reformers who would be capable of 
inspiring progress.62  For Dewey, “[t]he whole point of democracy is to provide the wherewithal 
for change, for improvement.”63  Education was viewed by Dewey as essential to progress.64 
“If some people within a democratic society are practically enslaved, even those who are 
privileged suffer as a result.”65  This insight connects with then State Senator Barack Obama’s 
acclaimed speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention:  
It’s not enough for just some of us to prosper.  For alongside our famous 
individualism, there’s another ingredient in the American saga.  A belief that 
we’re all connected as one people.  If there is a child on the south side of Chicago 
who can’t read, that matters to me, even if it’s not my child.  If there is a senior 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
dependent in the education of citizenry, which in turn leads to society that progresses improves 
over time as a consequence of education being a social function). 
61.  The belief has much in common with what is considered the cornerstone of 
progressive political ideology, which believes in progress through social and political change.  
See James W. Ceaser, Progressivism and the Doctrine of Natural Rights, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 
177, 177-95 (2012). 
62.  Please insert a reference to EDWARDS, supra note 43 at 78, then insert editor’s 
suggestion as a see also. DOUGLAS J. SIMPSON & MICHAEL J.B. JACKSON, EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM: A DEWEYAN PERSPECTIVE 272 (1997). [please send me a pdf of the suggested citation] 
63.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 78. 
64.  REARDON, supra note 54, at 5-7. [PLEASE SEND ME A PDF] 
65.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 75. 
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citizen somewhere who can’t pay for their prescription drugs, and having to 
choose between medicine and the rent, that makes my life poorer, even if it’s not 
my grandparent.  If there’s an Arab American family being rounded up without 
benefit of an attorney or due process that threatens my civil liberties.66  
  
Those famous words from 2004 continue to summarize the American ethic and observed reality 
that deprivation and oppression anywhere in society is detrimental even to the most privileged 
within that society.  Protecting human dignity is therefore essential if the U.S. hopes to realize 
the words on the Great Seal of the United States of E. Pluribus Unum – out of many one. 
I begin this section by first examining the concept of human dignity and its relationship 
to education.67  Education rights advocates and leaders have suggested various educational 
approaches over the years, but a theme that most of these approaches share is an unstated but 
widely understood goal of enhancing human dignity.68  I therefore examine the concept of 
                                                 
 
66.  Senator Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the 2004 Democratic National 
Convention (July 27, 2004). 
67.  KANT, supra note 58, at 24, 43. 
68.  See, e.g., Robin West, The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to Secure 
the Material Preconditions for a Good Society:  Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1902 (2001).  West argues:  
Many citizens of even prosperous democratic states cannot possibly enjoy such a 
minimal threshold, furthermore, without some state involvement in the 
distribution of resources, particularly with the inequalities that persist and threaten 
to worsen today.  States are required, by justice and goodness both, to treat 
citizens with dignity, and with equal dignity at that.   
 
Id. at 1902.  See also Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 
  
liberty, its general relevance to democracy, and its special relevance to American democratic 
society.  The idea of the individual and the protection of individual liberty are essential 
components to  democracy.  Human dignity is essential to any meaningful concept of liberty, and 
education is essential to dignity and democracy. 
A. Defining and Applying Human Dignity 
1. The Components of Dignity 
The relationship between education and dignity is that education is essential to the 
development of the capabilities necessary to be a fully realized human being.69  Human dignity 
includes people’s freedom to pursue their ambitions without being unfairly or unjustly 
hindered.70  Human dignity requires a degree of influence over those structures that occasionally 
impinge on individual freedom.  Hence, modern political and legal theory views the protection of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
68–69 (2011) (discussing the concept of human dignity and relevant approaches to reaching it, 
including negative and positive rights theories); Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 60 (“Thomas 
Jefferson and his fellow founding fathers wrote official declarations and papers that espoused a 
civic philosophy that public education is essential to a democracy.  They espoused normative 
arguments favoring public education that have continued to be articulated by more contemporary 
educational philosophers like John Dewey.”). 
69.  There is a necessary connection between autonomy and dignity, as Kant proclaimed 
that “[a]utonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational 
creature.”  KANT, supra note 58, at 43.  
70.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 35-40 
(2004).[please send pdf] 
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and respect for what is generally framed as “human dignity” as an essential function of any 
modern government or political system.71  Such influence is relevant for ensuring that individual 
liberty is not undermined without individual consent.72  Liberty is an essential component to 
dignity, as is democracy.73 
Leslie Meltzer Henry explains in The Jurisprudence of Dignity that the concept of dignity 
is dynamic, so that its meaning depends on the context of its usage.74  In exploring the concept of 
dignity in the constitutional law context, she finds, among other things, that the Court’s reliance 
on dignity is increasing and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend.75  A recent example of 
this increased application of dignity-based arguments is the decision in Lawrence v. Texas.76  
2. Lawrence v. Texas Applied Human Dignity to Expand Constitutional Rights   
 
                                                 
 
71.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 77-79. 
72.  JOSEPH WRONKA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 123-27 (1998). [please send pdf] 
  
73.  Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a 
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 498-502 (2009). 
74.  Henry, supra note 55, at 177, 186-188.  
75.  Id. at 171-172.   
76.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (ruling a Texas anti-sodomy statute 
unconstitutional based on liberty, privacy, and dignity interest in having a safe zone for intimate 
relationships). 
  
Lawrence v. Texas underscores the current application of human dignity-based arguments 
in construing and expanding U.S. constitutional rights.  In Lawrence, the Court applied a human 
dignity-based due process clause analysis to hold that a Texas sodomy law was an 
unconstitutional infringement on the right to privacy.77 
The facts of Lawrence involved local police responding to a neighbor’s noise complaint 
to discover two men engaging in homosexual sodomy.78  Police arrested the men pursuant to the 
Texas anti-sodomy law that was later challenged as an unconstitutional violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.79  Here, the Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, holding that the 
right to privacy protects the right to be free from invasive governmental intrusion into a private 
sexual encounter between consenting adults because a right to privacy in such an intimate setting 
is essential to human dignity.80    
                                                 
 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id.; James Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 41 HOUS. LAW. 32, 33 
(2004) (discussing the facts of the case and how Justice Kennedy’s analysis that stressed dignity 
and liberty is a better approach than using Equal Protection Clause and that the case signifies a 
shift from privacy jurisprudence to liberty centered rationale).  
79.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63. 
80.  Id. (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right 
to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives 
and still retain their dignity as free persons.”); Yoshino, supra note 22, at 779 (discussing the 
importance of the Lawrence Court’s liberty-based dignity analysis, which could be asserted more 
often in the future); Lisa K. Parshall, Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony Kennedy 
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion explicitly relied on the concept of dignity as the basis 
for recognizing a protected “zone of liberty.”81  Kennedy’s interpretation ultimately broadens the 
Court’s liberty doctrine and effectively broadens the scope of recognized constitutional rights.82  
The liberty doctrine is broadened by applying and interpreting a concept that is never explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, human dignity.83  “These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”84   
The Court has thus demonstrated its continuing willingness to first, recognize and enforce 
extra-textual constitutional rights, in the form of fundamental rights, and to interpret those rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
and the Concept of Emergent Rights, 69 ALB L. REV. 237, 238-239, 280-282 (2005) (discussing 
that liberty-centered approach is a better way to frame fundamental rights, that an Equal 
Protection analysis may be deemed erroneous with intolerable results (like the State could have 
banned sodomy altogether), and that the concept of emergent rights can be support by the 
analysis in Lawrence). 
81.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562; Parshall, supra note 92, at 239. 
82.   
Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 65, 68–69 (2011). 
.   
83.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 . 
84 Id. 
  
using extra-textual terms.85  The Lawrence decision also demonstrates the Court’s willingness to 
interpret those rights by applying a particular extra-textual concept, human dignity as it relates to 
liberty.86  A similar human dignity-based interpretation of the due process clause can be applied 
to recognize a right to public education.   
B. Education is Essential to the Liberty Component to Human Dignity 
 I have suggested that human dignity has two major components, a liberty component and 
a democracy component.  Education is essential to the liberty component of human dignity 
because education is a basic human capability that is necessary to achieve valuable human 
functionings or achievements.87  Any denial of opportunities for individuals to develop their 
capabilities undermines human dignity.88   
1. Rousseau and Dewey Connect Education with Liberty and Dignity  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey have both suggested that education is essential 
to individual liberty and human dignity.  Rousseau’s education philosophy holds that education 
is the vehicle through which the individual can be trained to fully participate in society.89  In the 
Emile, Rousseau set out his paradigm for educating children as a vehicle for improving society, 
                                                 
 
 96.  Citation needed. 
86.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) . 
87.  AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, 7, 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
(“A functioning is an achievement of a person, what he or she manages to do or to be.”).  
88.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 18-20. 
89.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 7. 
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the individual, and the political community.90  Rousseau uses the example of educating a boy 
named Emile to examine education and development through childhood and emphasizes the 
significance of developing a child’s capabilities and ensuring individual autonomy and liberty 
through education.91 
Likewise, the more modern education philosophy of John Dewey calls for enhancing 
individual liberty by way of guaranteeing opportunities to learn and develop essential 
capabilities.   
                                                 
 
90.  Id.  Among his important contributions is the idea that education should be in 
harmony with the development of the child’s natural capacities by a process of apparently 
autonomous discovery.  Id. [Also consider citing to Emile]  Learning by way of autonomous 
discovery, otherwise known as discovery based learning, is frequently applied in the legal 
academy by way of a strategy popularly known as the Socratic method.  [Citation needed.] [I’m 
happy to include an Emile reference. Please pdf the relevant section] 
While specific pedagogical method evaluation is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
within the scope to recognize that notwithstanding the costs and benefits to the autonomous 
discovery approach, there is an underlying philosophy of respecting individual autonomy and 
attempting to reinforce it when educating through a process of self-discovery.  Discovery based 
learning, in part, is meant to cultivate individual liberty by encouraging independent thought and 
understanding.  While Rousseau’s methods from Emile have been critiqued for their 
effectiveness in cultivating individual liberty, this was clearly a central goal for Rousseau.  
91.  See ROUSSEAU, supra note 100. 
  
In educating to produce the ‘best’ person, Dewey stresses the freedom of the 
individual.  . . . Their own particular talents, abilities, and qualities are to be 
developed in accord with their own nature.  . . . The success and happiness of the 
individual is impossible without the individual being an integral part of the group, 
the society.92   
 
Thus, Dewey emphasized individual freedom, development of capabilities, and acculturation into 
democratic society as cornerstone goals for education.  Dewey, much like Rousseau, was 
“primarily interested in the development of the qualities [and] capacities which . . . make up 
autonomy.”93  In order for there to be any meaningful concept of personal liberty, as defined by 
the capability to think and act independently, both Rousseau and Dewey believed education was 
necessary.  “An enormous part of personal liberty for Dewey [was what he referred to as] 
freedom of intelligence, observation, or judgment.  . . . [P]eople cannot become significantly 
more autonomous without freedom of expression.”94   
 For Dewey, education was a necessary component to being able to think well enough to 
effectuate the basic civil liberty of free expression.  Dewey’s approach foreshadowed the 
contemporary capabilities approach.95  Indeed, both Dewey and today’s capabilities theorists 
share an insight regarding the fundamentality of education in protecting and advancing human 
dignity.96 
                                                 
 
92.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 9-10.  See also DEWEY, supra note 14, at 15 (arguing 
that education is a social function and that  a person needs society to be educated and in turn, 
society as a whole benefit). 
93.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 6. 
94.  Id. at 73. 
95  
96  
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2. Education is a Basic Human Capability 
Education is a basic human capability that is necessary for advancing both liberty and 
human dignity under Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.97 The 
capabilities approach is particularly relevant to the discussion of an education right because it has 
become an internationally embraced modern theory of justice that shares an American embrace 
of equal opportunity while accepting some social and economic inequality when it is a 
consequence of mertiocracy.98   
The capabilities approach holds that the well-being of the people in a society should be 
assessed by the capabilities of the people living within that society to obtain what Sen describes 
as “valuable functionings,” which can be thought of as important life achievements.99  Valuable 
achievements include such important components to life and liberty as education, as well as 
                                                 
 
97.  See, e.g., SEN, supra note 15, at 5 (“What people can positively achieve is influenced 
by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good 
health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives.”).   
98.  Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 46-47.  See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at ix-xii.  
Id. at x. 
99  
The capabilities approach is an approach to evaluating a society based on the capability of 
the people within the society to “achieve valuable functionings.” ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 
56 (citing Sen’s work). Under the capabilities approach, “functionings” refers to individual 
achievements and what individuals manage to do or become. See SEN, supra note 98, at 7-9.  A 
just political system or ideal society is a society that enhance people’s capabilities, where 
capabilities refers to what “reflects the various combinations of functionings [a person] can 
achieve… and, “a functioning is an achievement of a person what he or she manages to do or to 
be.”  Id. at 7.   
  
food, self-respect, and political participation.100  Absent such valuable achievements, quality of 
life and meaningful freedom is undermined.101  Capabilities can be simply defined as access or 
opportunity to achieve.102  It is the capability to achieve and not the achievements themselves 
that are of central concern under the capabilities approach.  Notably, under the capabilities 
approach, education is both an achievement and a capability.103 
Sen has suggested that access to certain fundamental services that advance human 
capabilities must be considered when the United Nations and other international bodies evaluate 
a society or a nation.104  Nussbaum has gone beyond Sen’s original approach and has generated a 
list of ten basic capabilities that are necessary for governments to guarantee; among those ten 
                                                 
 
100.  See SEN, supra note 15, at 3 (arguing that freedom is contingent on social and 
economic arrangements that include facilities for education and health care). 
101.  See NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 17-18. 
102.  “A just political system or ideal society is a society that enhance people’s 
capabilities, where capabilities refers to what “reflects the various combinations of functionings 
[a person] can achieve… and, “a functioning is an achievement of a person what he or she  
manages to do or to be.”  SEN, supra note 98, at 7, 9. 
103.  ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 2.  See also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-
being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 31 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen Eds., 1993) (stating 
that “[t]he capability of a person reflects alternative combinations of functionings the person can 
achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection.”).   
104.  SEN, supra note 18, at 226-27. 
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basic capabilities is education.105  Nussbaum specifically advocates for the fundamentality of 
education and a few other essential rights as precursors to liberty and democracy.106 The 
capabilities approach as an economic and legal theory today influences international evaluative 
criteria for a nation’s well-being to the point that the United Nations Development Programme 
now uses capabilities approach inspired measurements as developmental goals, as bases for 
evaluating progress, and in formulating objective measures for comparing nations.107   
 As both Sen and Nussbaum have noted, without an education an individual cannot 
meaningfully engage in political deliberation.108  Additionally, education is the vehicle for 
potentially furthering other basic human achievements such as longer life expectancy and good 
health, as well as the more complex human achievements of self-respect and social status.109  If 
we translate capabilities as shorthand for equal opportunity, then we see education as the 
                                                 
 
105.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 33-34.  This is unlike Sen, who refuses to suggest a 
list of capabilities because he believes that any list ought to be the product of a deliberative 
democratic process and not dictated by experts and theorists. ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 64.  
See generally SEN, supra note 15; Nussbaum, while sharing Sen’s commitment to democratic 
decision-making, argues for protecting a basic list of those capabilities that are so essential to 
Aristotle’s concept of “truly basic human functioning.” ALEXANDER, supra note 47, at 125; 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 125-131 (summarizing the views of Aristotle and the Stoics). 
106.  Id. at 33-35. 
107 See id. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at 16, 19-20, 29-33, 78-79. 
  
ultimate capability, and essential to any meaningful conception of dignity and freedom. 
3. Equal Opportunity to Achieve is Essential to Liberty  
Equal opportunity in the form of equal access to public education is essential to liberty.  
The U.S. embraces individual liberty both politically and socially, so that respect for individual 
liberty and human dignity requires that individuals not be arbitrarily barred from developing 
their capabilities. 110  Stated differently, equal and fair opportunity is essential to American 
liberty. 
During a less enlightened time in U.S. history it was acceptable for housing and 
occupation options to be limited based solely on place of birth, race, or gender. 111   All other 
limitations violate our principle of equality, which is itself based in a concept of meritocracy. 
Despite progress in advancing human dignity, even today everyone is not entitled to work and 
live wherever they want, but rather, people can live and work wherever they want only to the 
extent that their abilities and individual merit entitles them to that privilege.  Hence, our concept 
of human dignity has transformed from one that is limited by immutable characteristics into one 
                                                 
 
110.  A corollary to this national faith is the belief that government should play a role in 
removing arbitrary and unjust barriers to attaining the capabilities necessary for valuable 
achievements such as wealth and status. RAWLS, supra note 75, at 63, 87-88. 
111.  RAWLS, supra note 75, at 87.  John Rawls discusses undeserved merit.  “The 
naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the 
costs of training and education and for using the endowments in ways that help the less fortunate 
as well. No one deserves his greater capacity nor merits a favorable starting place in society.”  
Id. 
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that is only limited by individual merit, ability or achievements.112   
Today, the concept of American meritocracy is applied to help justify what are clear 
affronts to human dignity.  For example, the unsafe and unclean living conditions of the 
impoverished are justified based on an unstated assumption that those who are impoverished - 
those who have less than they would need to function in a dignified manner – are where they are 
because they are somehow underserving.  Under this ideology, poverty demonstrates that the 
impoverished lack the merit that would afford them the privileges of the more deserving, the 
more dignified.  That human dignity is intrinsic to all human beings is a truism that still 
continues to have a qualifier, a qualifier based in merit. The concept of merit is itself justified as 
flowing from a respect for individual liberty.  Underlying both the conceptions of merit and 
liberty is another qualifier, equal opportunity. 
The existence of equal opportunity – an equal and fair chance to become capable of 
achieving – provides the popular justification for what are obvious affronts to human dignity in 
the forms of actual inequality of resources, power, and privilege.113  Despite a respect for human 
dignity, such inequalities are acceptable under a meritocratic system that purports to reward the 
best and brightest who have achieved success in a fair political, legal and economic system that 
                                                 
 
112.  See id. at 87-88. 
113.  Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the 
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 
550, 595 (1992). 
  
guarantees fair and equal access.114 
Some undesirable and unjust inequality might be logically expected given that no human 
system is perfect. 115   However, America’s failure to adequately and equally provide meaningful 
opportunities for the children of low-income and minority parents to develop their capabilities is 
consistent and systemic and not random.116  This failure must be corrected because these failures 
undermine the ability of these children to develop their individual capabilities and therefore 
undermines their liberty to pursue their goals.117   
                                                 
 
114.  Id. at 551, 618. 
 115.  Such acceptance would be based in a pragmatic view that secular and religious 
philosophies have at times begrudgingly accepted; such notions as “the poor will always be with 
us” and “to err is human” encapsulate that even idealistic models recognize the limitations of 
human capabilities.  ALEXANDER POPE, POPE’S ESSAY ON CRITICISM PAGE (Frederick M. A. 
Ryland ed., Blackie & Son 1900) (1711).  “To err is human to forgive divine” - Alexander 
Pope, An Essay on Criticism; Bible Quote: Mark, Chapter 14, v. 7. 
116.  See supra Part I – the nature of the problem section.  SEN, supra note 15, at 3-5. 
This situation is not based in the inevitability of human failure or the tragedy of imperfect human 
institutions. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1637, 1662-1664 (1999). 
117.  See Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1917 (2004).  See also Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting The 
Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 18 (1969); Frank I. Michelman, 
In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View Of Rawls’ Theory Of Justice, 121 U. PA. 
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Individual liberty has long been recognized as essential to democracy.  Education 
philosopher and historian, Anne Michaels Edwards notes, “[w]hatever else education is, and 
whatever other goals it may have, it is clear that one of the goals of any and all education is a 
particular kind of person.”118  Edwards, like others, recognizes that central to any system of 
education is a goal of inculcating the values necessary to function within a particular social and 
political system.119  Therefore, it is important to appreciate that in the American context, 
education is concerned with using public education to inculcate democratic values such as a  
concept of individual liberty. 
C. Education is Essential to the Democratic Component to Human Dignity 
 Education is essential to the democratic component of human dignity because at the heart 
of democracy is the protection of individual autonomy.120  As A. John Simmons has noted, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
L. REV. 962, 991 (1973); Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 203, 210 (2008). 
118.  EDWARDS, supra note 42, at 2. 
119.  Id. at 2-3. 
120.  Thus, the underlying theory is that the only legitimate system for passing laws that 
may constrain individual liberty is a form of government that functions with the consent of the 
individual’s being governed. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 55 (C. B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690) (“[T]he governments of the world, that were 
begun in peace, had their beginning . . . , and were made by the consent of the people; there can 
be little room for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of 
  
Locke, individuals ought not to be “obligated to support or comply with any political power 
unless he [or she] has personally consented to its authority.”121  Locke’s government consent 
ideal is based in a respect for the liberty component of human dignity that is closely linked with 
the Greek roots for democracy, which literally translates to “rule by the people.122 Democracy, 
with its attendant requirement of popular consent, is an essential component to furthering human 
dignity.123  Hence, at its very root, democracy is defined as the ultimate respect for liberty, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
mankind, about the first erecting of governments.”).  See also Rousseau, supra note 101, at 148-
149.  
121.  A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
274, 274 (1976). 
122.  Id. at 714.  According to Locke: 
Every man, as has been shewd, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into 
subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be 
understood to be sufficient declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of 
any government. LOCKE, supra note 157, at 63; See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 275 (defining 
“democracy” as “any regime in which the ‘people’ (dēmos) rule or control the authoritative 
institution of the city; more properly, rule of the poor or the majority in their own interests”). 
123.  John Locke’s model is not without its criticisms.  Hume famously objects to John 
Locke’s consent theory as described in Locke’s social contract based on its concept of “tacit 
consent.”  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 490 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1739).  See also Simmons, supra note 163, at 274.  
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freedom of the people to make their own choices by deciding their own legal constraints.124 
1. Theories of Dignity and Education have Progressed Alongside Theories of Liberty 
and Democracy 
 
The idea of the individual and the attendant concepts of dignity, democracy and public 
education, have developed together through a related historical progression towards greater 
respect for the dignity, capabilities, and rights of people.125  Classical thinkers like Plato and 
Aristotle did not believe each person ought to participate in politics and governance nor did they 
believe that every citizen needed a shared baseline of education.126  Plato and his student, 
Aristotle, instead believed in a form of aristocracy where the most innately brilliant and qualified 
would govern and that only those selected aristocrats ought to be educated enough to participate 
in governance and political decision-making.127  The aristocrats would be the ruling elite and 
                                                 
 
124.  Rousseau, supra note 101, at 162 (“Strictly speaking, laws are merely the 
conditions of civil association.  The populace that is subjected to the laws ought to be their 
author.”).  
125.  ROSEN, supra note 57, at __. 
126.   
127.  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 129 (“Only the regime that is made up of those 
who are best simply on the basis of virtue . . . is justly referred to as aristocracy . . . .”).  See also 
NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 129-130 (discussing how the Stoics put their theories into practice 
when they campaigned for the equal education of women, one former slave (Epictetus) and one 
foreigner (Seneca)).  Id. at 492; Plato, The Republic Book VI, in THE PORTABLE PLATO PAGE, 
510-512 (Scott Buchanan ed. & Benjamin Jovett trans., Penguin Books 1977) (DATE). 
  
therefore needed to have a certain freedom to think and an education sufficient to ensure that 
they were capable of properly ruling.128  It is notable that despite their restrictive theories of 
governance, both Plato and Aristotle recognized public education of the ruling elite as essential 
to responsible governing.129   
Later, Rousseau suggested a broader scope for who ought to be educated, but, like the 
classical thinkers, he continued to believe that there ought to be a class of people not involved in 
governing.130  Rousseau believed that for that non-governing class of people, liberty should be 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Until philosophers are kings, or the king and princes of this world have the spirit and 
power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner 
natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will 
never have rest from their evils—no, nor the human race, as I believe,---and then only will this 
our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. 
128.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 129; NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 129-130. 
129.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 229 (“Since there is a single end for the city as a 
whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all . . . .”). 
130.  Rousseau and other Enlightenment era thinkers adopted broader views regarding 
the scope of who ought to be educated and trained for governance.  However, even Rousseau 
believed that certain classes of people and forms of work were unsuitable for active participation 
in politics and governance, and hence, members of such classes were not seen as needing 
education. See Michalina Clifford-Vaughan, Enlightenment and Education, 14 BRIT. J. OF SOC. 
135, 135-136 (1963).  Dennis Diderot was another enlightenment thinker who valued education 
as much as “[d]isciples of Rousseau, the legislators of the First Republic wanted to make citizens 
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constrained by the educated ruling class because the non-ruling class’ preferences were irrelevant 
and potentially hostile to social order.131  This history of education and liberty parallels Michael 
Rosen’s history of the meaning of dignity.132  Dignity, like education was initially viewed as an 
exclusive privilege for the powerful ruling elites.133  Today the concept of dignity has been 
expanded to apply to all human beings.134 
Likewise, democracy has not historically been the most widely used or preferred system 
of government; that has changed as the idea of the individual and the concept of human dignity 
has been broadened to grant a broader range of people individual liberty and freedom.135  Liberty 
has different meanings and is arguably more constrained in the contexts of autocracy, 
aristocracy, and plutocracy.136  Democracy, given its central concern with majority consent, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
free by liberating their minds from prejudice through education.”  Id. at 135. ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 12, at __; ARISTOTLE, supra note 168, at __. 
 131.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at __; ARISTOTLE, supra note 168, at __.  
132.  ROSEN, supra note 57, at __. 
133.  Id. at __. 
134.  Id. at __. 
135.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 97 (“What makes democracy and oligarchy differ is 
poverty and wealth: whenever some rule on account of wealth, whether a minority or a majority, 
this is necessarily an oligarchy, and whenever those who are poor, a democracy.”).  
136.  These forms of government are all quite unlike our modern U.S. democracy, where 
an individual’s liberty to make life decisions is constrained by laws that are passed by 
  
provides the greatest respect for individual liberty for the greatest number of individuals.137  
Plutocracy, which literally means “rule by the wealthy,” does not similarly value the concerns of 
all the people, but only those of the wealthy.138  The democratic and dignity-based critiques of 
plutocracy directly apply to current fears regarding a rising “corporatocracy;”139 the concerns 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
representatives of the people.  Aristocracy has as its Greek root “aristocratia,” which literally 
means “rule by the best,” where “aristoi” means “the best.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 
XX (2d ed. 2010).  Autocracy is the authority of the autocrat, the government in which one 
person possesses unlimited power.  Id. at __.  Autocrat is defined as a monarch with unlimited 
power.  Id. at __.  In an autocracy, governance by a single ruler, the concept of autonomy and the 
related freedom of the individual to make life choices would be seen as being properly limited by 
the will of the autocrat, who could be a monarch or dictator.    
137.   
 138.  Plutocracy has as its root Pluto, the god of the underworld.  Pluto is less widely 
known as the god of wealth and treasure.  The Greek root of the word plutocracy is “plutos,” 
which means “wealth” in Greek.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY __ (2d ed. 2010).    
139. See Priti Nemani, Note, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on 
the Failure of the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 96, 99-100; see 
also Thayer Watkins, The Economic System of Corporatism, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/corporatism.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).  Watkins 
states: 
The basic idea of corporatism is that the society and economy of a country should 
be organized into major interest groups (sometimes called corporations) and 
representatives of those interest groups settle any problems through negotiation 
and joint agreement. In contrast to a market economy which operates through 
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regarding rule by wealthy interest groups whose only governing morality is the enhancement of 
their group’s wealth and power.140  As Priti Nemani notes: 
Journalist John Perkins describes the advancement of the global empire as 
a result of the omnipotent “corporatocracy,” a tripartite financial and political 
power relationship between multinational corporations (“MNCs”), international 
banks, and governments. The corporatocracy works to guarantee the unwavering 
support and belief of its constituents  schools, business, and the media--in the 
“fallacious concept” of growing global consumer culture Members of the 
corporatocracy promote common values and goals through an unceasing effort “to 
perpetuate and continually expand and strengthen the system” of the current 
global culture. Unfortunately, the global culture is not one of social understanding 
and sensitivity to individual cultures; rather, the new global culture is one marked 
by the ability to empower one’s citizens to consume as if product consumption is 
the ultimate civic duty.141 
 
Arguably, the potential erosion of civic virtue in the face of plutocratic governance models 
coincides with a decrease in respect for individual liberty and human dignity.142   
Respect for individual liberty and the dignity of every human being has long been central 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
competition a corporate economic [sic] works through collective bargaining. 
 
Id.   
 
140.  See Priti Nemani, Note, Globalization Versus Normative Policy: A Case Study on 
the Failure of the Barbie Doll in the Indian Market, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 96, 99-100 
(2011); JOHN PERKINS, CONFESSIONS OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN 26-28 (2005). 
141.  Nemani, supra note 183, at 99-100.  See also PERKINS, supra note 183, at 26-28.  
142.  Linda L. Fowler, The Best Congress Money Can Buy, 6 ELECTION L.J. 417, 419 
(2007); Rousseau, supra note 101, at 151 (“What man loses through the social contract is his 
natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can acquire. What 
he gains is civil liberty and propriety ownership of all he possesses.”). 
  
to the U.S. national creed.143  As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, American democracy is 
structured to further equality.144 In the U.S., the government and its leaders within it are defined 
as subject to the people, so that those who lead are public servants and not rulers. 145  
American democracy in its ideal form represents progress towards a more inclusive 
                                                 
 
143.  See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 94-95, 123-124, 175, 287-
288 (David Campbell trans., Everyman’s Library 1995) (1835, 1840). 
144.  Id. 
145.  This commitment to equality is not entirely unique to the U.S.  Indeed, many 
modern autocracies style themselves “constitutional monarchies” and recognize a realm of 
individual liberty that even an autocrat may not infringe.  However, the fundamental principle 
underlying even these constitutional monarchies is that the people are subjects to the ruler and 
thus sit beneath their government as subservient or subject to it . Id.  According to Fowler,  
Every election cycle sparks stories of wealthy candidates pumping 
millions of their own money into campaigns to buy a seat in the House or Senate.  
The successful ones prompt cries of alarm about plutocrats hijacking the 
American democracy; the failures invite scorn for underestimating the capacity of 
ordinary voters to refuse to be bought. 
 
Id. at 417; See RAYMOND V. PADILLA, EPISTEMOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION, AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 8 (2004) (citing ROBERT K. GREENLEAF, DON M. FRICK & LARRY C. SPEARS, 
ON BECOMING A SERVANT LEADER (1996)).  According to Padilla,  
Citizenship includes the cultivation of civic life and the creation of leaders as 
public servants.  Through the practice of leadership and civic life, a set of 
relations is established by each individual with society.  It is within this set of 
social relations that specific collective issues can be explored, such as justice, 
ethics, philanthropy, politics, etc., issues having to do with our need to get along 
with others and to lead productive lives.  
 
Id. at 8. 
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concept of human dignity.  However, because each citizen is expected to be capable of 
meaningfully participating in the political process, everybody, both the elected representatives 
and those who elect them, needs to be educated enough to be capable of self-governance.146 
2. Education is Essential to Democratic Society 
  Education philosopher John Dewey recognized that education is essential to democratic 
society for reasons similar to those espoused by today’s capabilities approach theorists.147   
“The task of democracy is the creation of freer experiences in which all participate . . . .  If 
democracy has an ideal meaning ‘it is that a social return be demanded from all and that 
opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all.’”148  
 
Dewey considered democracy as the most legitimate system of government because it educates 
citizens so that they are capable of ruling.149   
Likewise, Amy Gutmann also discusses the necessary constraints on democracy and 
expounds upon the need for “more democratic education to make our politics more 
democratic.”150  Like Dewey, Gutmann 
                                                 
 
146.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 76. 
 147.  See id. at 85. 
148.  Id. at 76 (quoting DEWEY, supra note 14, at 122).  
 149.  Id. 
150.  EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118.  In Liberal Equality, Gutmann argues that “people 
who do not have a standard of living sufficient to secure basic welfare for themselves simply 
cannot be expected to participate in politics as extensively and with as much political 
information as the more advantaged.” EDWARDS, supra note 43, at 118 (quoting AMY 
  
[I]n large part, opts for more of a collective control over education, but by 
recognizing that a democratic education is one where many individuals and groups 
have a say in the goals of education, she recognizes that parents, teachers, citizens, 
and public officials, as well as the children themselves, must all have a hand in 
determining goals, policies, and functions for the schools.151    
 
Regardless of what policies are enacted, or what definition of “quality” is ultimately applied, to 
be legitimate, quality definitions and school policies ought to be determined through a 
democratic process.152  
Gutmann recognizes the special importance of education to democractic society by 
suggesting that as long as children are educated to a certain threshold for democratic 
participation, there is no concern regarding equality in funding or resources.153 This insight 
suggests a need for at least a minimally adequate public education.154  While Gutmann’s 
perspective regarding minimum adequacy is somewhat inconsistent with a full commitment to 
human dignity, at least she acknowledges that minimally adequate educational is essential to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 190 (1980)). 
151.  Id. at __. 
152.  For Gutmann, “the value of democratic deliberation is so great as to override ‘the 
value of being governed by just laws that are not democratically enacted.’ Id. at 119 (quoting 
AMY GUTMANN, HOW LIBERAL IS DEMOCRACY? 37 (1983)). 
153.  For Gutmann, the goal of education should be to ensure ‘“children learn enough to 
participate effectively in the democratic process[.]’ . . . [I]t doesn’t require, however, that either 
the ‘inputs’ or the ‘outcomes’ be equalized.”  Id. at 120-21 (quoting AMY GUTMANN, 
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 170 (1987)). 
154.  See id. at 120-21. 
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maintaining a functional democracy.155  Preservation of democracy is important, the principle 
aim of both public education and democracy is to enhance human dignity by developing 
individual’s capabilities.156  
“[D]emocracy’s obligation to education goes beyond mere schooling.  The state must 
provide access to a variety of other goods and services – ‘decent housing, job training and 
employment for parents, family counseling, day care and after-school programs for children, 
etc.’”157 
For believers in the modern, universal concept of human dignity, a possible reversion to 
less democratic and less inclusive form of governance after millennia of long historical progress 
in liberalizing the concept of human dignity is cause for concern.158  Whether the alternative 
system of governance is autocracy, aristocracy, plutocracy, or some derivation thereof, in all 
these other forms of governance, only the members of the select ruling class are expected to 
obtain the basic education necessary to govern.159  Education is, as it always has been, essential 
                                                 
 
155.  See Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 86.  
156.  From Gutmann’s perspective, positive rights connect together through what she 
views as the most essential obligations of democratic government: the duty to provide public 
education.  
157 Id. (quoting AMY GUTTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 151 (1987)). 
158.  As compared to autocracy, the scope of those with influence over law and liberty 
choices is expanded in an aristocracy and in plutocracy to include a group that is considered to 
be particularly suited to make such decisions—whether because of birth right, talent, or wealth in 
the case of plutocracy.  However, that group remains small especially when compared to 
democracy.  
159.  
  
to ensuring that true democracy continues. 
Like the right to privacy, education is also essential to liberty.  The connection between 
education and liberty has been recognized in the classical, enlightenment era, and modern 
philosophies of Aristotle, Rousseau, John Dewey, and today’s capabilities theorists.160  The case 
for a human dignity-based constitutional protection for the right to public education is even 
stronger than the already recognized human dignity-based constitutional protection for the right 
to privacy.  This is because, unlike the right to privacy, education is essential to both the liberty 
component and to the democracy component of human dignity.  Despite a broad consensus 
regarding the importance of primary and secondary education, educational opportunity is 
systematically denied to the children of racial-ethnic minorities and to underprivileged children 
                                                 
 
160.  See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 229 (“Since there is a single end for the city 
as a whole, it is evident that education must necessarily be one and the same for all . . . .”); 
DEMOCRACY: A READER, supra note 13, at 100 (Rousseau explains that “through the social 
contract we gain civil liberty and moral liberty: the former involves being ruled by a general will 
instead of our individual self-interest.  The latter means obedience to rules which we, in 
association with our fellow citizens, have made.”); supra note 13, at 11-15, 46-50, 54-60 JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 11-15, 46-50, 54-60 (G.D.H. Cole 
trans., Dent 1958); DEWEY, supra note 14, at 4; SEN, supra note 15, at 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144.  
See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 32-33.  Among Nussbaum’s brief list of ten centrally 
important capabilities is the capability for “Senses, Imagination, and Thought.”  Id. at 33.  
Nussbaum explains that the capability to think and reason in a “truly human” way requires an 
adequate education.  Id. 
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of every race.161  No single factor is more indicative of the sort of education a child will receive 
than the socioeconomic status of that child’s parents.162  As stated, systemic failures are not 
incapable of correction.  However, U.S. Constitutional law doctrine has gotten in the way.   
III. FAILURES OF EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
Equal Protection clause jurisprudence has retreated from the early commitment to equal 
access to high quality, public education that the Court demonstrated in Brown v. Board of 
Education.163  Brown demonstrated an unambiguous recognition that public education is 
important.164  
Since Brown, there has been a marked jurisprudential shift away from this recognition by 
the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court, and today’s far right-of-center Roberts Court.165  The 
Court has all but abandoned its earlier “equality jurisprudence” in favor of a “liberty-centered 
jurisprudence,” which it wrongly perceives as being in conflict with the principle of equality.  
                                                 
 
161.  Chambers, supra note 31, at 55-59.  
162.  Id. 
163.  347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
164.  Id. 
165.  Yoshino, supra note 22, at 748.  According to Yoshino,  
The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court reflects this pluralism 
anxiety. Over the past decades, the Court has systematically denied constitutional 
protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered groups, and limited 
Congress's capacity to protect groups through civil rights legislation. The Court 
has repeatedly justified these limitations by adverting to pluralism anxiety. These 
cases signal the end of equality doctrine as we have known it. 
 
Id. 
 
  
Equality remains a fundamental principle of American democracy, but because of the Court’s 
negative rights bias, it has failed to recognize how equality and liberty can be reconciled.166 
The negative rights bias refers to the concern that the Court favors negative rights, which 
are otherwise referred to as liberties, over positive rights, which are otherwise referred to as 
duties.167  The Court’s preference towards recognizing liberties, which have been defined as 
freedoms from government action, has animated a libertarian perspective that has driven our 
constitutional jurisprudence to the point that the Court is so deeply biased against recognizing the 
most obvious situations where government ought to have a duty to act.168   
                                                 
 
166.  See id.; SUNSTEIN, supra note 219, at 13 (noting the inclusion and importance of 
“the right to a good education” in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 123 
(2004) (concluding that federal courts have been “tragically wrong” in failing to find a 
constitutional right to education); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 
116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (arguing that the federal government has a constitutional duty to 
ensure that every child has the opportunity to receive an education). 
167.  See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110 (1978) (1935).  See also Osiatynski, 
supra note 13, at 233 (declaring that “[s]ocial and economic rights differ from civil liberties and 
political rights in that they call for positive action by the state to provide some citizens but not 
others with goods and services”). 
168.  See Jenna MacNaughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, 
Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 759-61 (2001).  See also Frank B. Cross, The Error 
of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 913-14 (2001). 
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Education is an obvious example of where there is a well-recognized duty to fairly and 
equally provide quality education.169  A right to public education is obviated by the modern 
concepts of human dignity and related democratic theory-based support for the duty of 
government to ensure a well-educated citizenry.170  Additionally, each state within the U.S. today 
recognizes a right to public education.  Despite the fact that each of the United States recognizes 
this duty, the Supreme Court would have us believe that the United States Constitution does 
not.171   
The Court was clearly wrong in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
                                                 
 
169.  See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Strengthening the Duty to Provide Public 
Education, 72 FLA. B.J., no. 9, 1998, at 28, 34. 
170.  See KANT, supra note 58, at 40-41.  See also ROSEN, supra note 57, at _; Henry, 
supra note 55, at 171-173 (discussing the concept of dignity being a governing notions in many 
cases). 
171.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education 
. . .  is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do 
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 
(1982) (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because their presence in this 
country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’  Nor is education a 
fundamental right; a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner 
in which education is provided to its population.”). 
  
when it declared that there is no right to public education.172  The Court has not always gotten 
this wrong.173  Brown v. Board of Education and other Warren Court era decisions indicate a 
prior willingness to consider freedom and equality from more than a negative perspective.174  
However, from the Burger Court onward, the Supreme Court has been redefining equality and 
freedom from a libertarian perspective, without appreciation for the basic tools and access 
                                                 
 
172.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
173.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (holding public school 
segregation unconstitutional); Daniel S. Greenspahn,  A Constitutional Right to Learn:  The 
Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 762 (2008).  
See also Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral Circumstance: Accounting for 
Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 485, 485-487 (1991) (arguing that the concept of 
equal protection has probably raised and dashed more expectations of social progress than any 
other constitutional provision and that the Equal Protection Clause has under-achieved its 
promise).  Lively argues:  
[T]he Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence not only promised unitary 
school systems but also equal educational opportunity.  Such aspirations have not 
been realized, however, and have actually been undercut by limiting constructions 
of the amendment that have left educational equality interests substantially 
unimproved or worse off.  Recent decisions, despite their rhetoric, exhibit a 
reluctance to confront the persistent reality of racial discrimination and suggest 
that the usefulness of the equal protection guarantee as a means of accounting for 
minority interests has been substantially undercut. 
 
Id. at 489-90. 
174.  Greenspahn, supra note 228, at 762.  Greenspahn argues that Brown clearly 
recognized the fundamental right to education, but the Court has since retreated from the promise 
of Brown.  Id. at 776. 
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required for any meaningful concept of liberty or democracy.175 
One solution that is alluded to in the title of the Fifth Freedom is to conceive of education 
as a liberty rather than as a duty.176  Deconstructing the negative versus positive rights dichotomy 
to the point that a education, a positive duty of government, is treated as a freedom177 is a 
strategy that could hold some promise beyond the education rights setting.178  So-called “false 
                                                 
 
175.  Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 77-78.  In that article, I argue that 
The libertarian perspective is primarily concerned with maintaining existing 
privileges and liberties, while deemphasizing the importance of positive rights or 
duties.  The libertarian perspective helps to enshrine an unjust distribution of 
resources by protecting the rights of the unfairly privileged to maintain exclusive 
privileges. 
 
Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
 
176.  Id. at 83. 
177 Id. at 47. 
178.  See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology And The Peremptory 
Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 78-79 (1993) (“The theoretical limitations of 
colorblindness arise from its obsession with procedure and its willful ignorance of results.  
Colorblind analysts tinker with the rules but need not attend to the outcome of the game.  
Richard Delgado calls this preference for equality of opportunity over equality of result a false 
dichotomy.” (footnote omitted)); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices 
And The Limits Of Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 363, 389 (1996) (“The process of 
counterbalancing white individuals' private interests against government programs that promote 
racial equality sets up a false dichotomy between private choices on the one hand and 
government action on the other.”).  See also Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional 
  
dichotomies” in law tend to reify legally constructed differences to the point of creating 
unnecessary policy challenges.179  Such a false dichotomy arguably exists in the context of 
negative versus positive rights.180  Education is a liberty, the liberty that President Lyndon B. 
Johnson famously referred to as “the freedom from ignorance.”181   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992); Mark Tushnet, The Left Critique of Normativity: A 
Comment, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2325 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political 
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 845 
(1990).  
179.  See Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State 
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 710 (2000).  See also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Making The Right Case For A Constitutional Right To Minimum Entitlements, 44 
MERCER L. REV. 525, 535-36 (1993). 
180.  See Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights As A Critique of the Liberal 
Paradigm, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 763, 764-65 (2003).  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 233, at 
535-536 (arguing for the affirmative duty of government to provide basic entitlements as 
Constitutional rights, including education); Liu, supra note 153 (modifying and formulating 
theory of social welfare rights, which justify and include the positive right to education). 
 181.  President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Education: “The 
Fifth Freedom,” PUB. PAPERS 54 (Feb. 5, 1968) (“The fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance.  
It means that every[one], everywhere, should be free to develop his talents to their full 
potential—unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or income.”).  See Imoukhuede, 
supra note 1, at 61.  
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A. Early Proclamations regarding Importance of Education 
1. Education was Viewed as Essential to Component to Freedom during Reconstruction 
Education has long been recognized and officially proclaimed as especially important by 
America’s founding leaders, law makers, and judges.182  America’s founders shared the 
previously described recognition that education is fundamental to democracy.183 
Education’s significance continued to be emphasized through declarations in the post-
Civil War Reconstruction era by various leaders who recognized the importance of education to 
the freedom and full citizenship for the newly freed slaves.184  During the Reconstruction, the 
federal agency known as the Freedman’s Bureau worked to do many things in order to help 
integrate the newly freed slaves into society, including establishing public schools throughout the 
South, where none had previously existed.185   Senators Blair, Hoar, and Perce were among the 
                                                 
 
182.  See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Amending the Constitution of William and 
Mary, and Substituting More Certain Revenues for Its Support (1779), in EDUCATION IN THE 
U.S., supra note 40, at 745-47; Thomas Jefferson, From Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe 
(Aug. 13, 1786), in EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra note 40, at 750-51; Thomas Jefferson, Notes 
on the State of Virginia(1801), in EDUCATION IN THE U.S., supra note 40, at 747-51. 
183.  See generally SAMUEL KNOX, AN ESSAY ON THE BEST SYSTEM OF LIBERAL 
EDUCATION, ADAPTED TO THE GENIUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1799). 
184.  W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 638 (Atheneum 1975). 
185.  Id. at 647-48. 
  
greatest proponents for establishing these “freedmen’s schools.”186   They and other proponents 
of education legislation respected the centrality of education to any meaningful concept of liberty 
and full democratic citizenship and political participation.187  
The Reconstruction Era freedmen’s schools were a manifestation of the social, political, 
and legal recognition of the centrality of education to any meaningful concept of American 
liberty and citizenship.188  As W.E.B. DuBois notes in his ground-breaking classic, Black 
Reconstruction in America, these efforts to establish freedmen’s schools in the South were the 
first efforts in the South to provide public education.189  Up until the Civil War, education in the 
South was largely seen as an enterprise for the privileged few; hence, there was no system of 
public schools prior to the efforts of African Americans and their northern allies.190  DuBois 
discusses in his lauded historical work, Black Reconstruction in America, how the public schools 
in the southern U.S. were founded:191   
 The first great mass movement for public education at the expense of the 
state, in the South, came from Negroes.  Many leaders before the [Civil War] had 
advocated general education, but few had been listened to.  Schools for indigents 
and paupers were supported, here and there, and more or less spasmodically.  
Some states had elaborate plans, but they were not carried out.  Public education 
for all at public expense was, in the South, a Negro idea.192 
                                                 
 
186.  Id. at __. 
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That free public education was a foreign concept to the South, imported from the North, 
is hardly surprising given the substantially different pre-Civil War or antebellum economies of 
both regions.193  The Northern economy was at the forefront of the global industrial revolution 
and therefore an educated populace was centrally important, if not to labor, then to innovation.194   
Whereas, the Southern economy an exploitative system of free slave labor, where the majority of 
“free” southern whites were subsistence level laborers with little hope of sharing in the wealth 
generated by such labor.195  Within this system, owners of property in the antebellum South did 
not believe laborers needed education and therefore did not want to be taxed for it.196  This 
further demonstrates the Southern ruling class’s adherence and continuing belief in an 
undemocratic, Aristotelian model for aristocratic governance and restrictive access to 
education.197   
Poor white laborers also saw no need for being educated.198  According to DuBois, poor 
                                                 
 
193.  Id. at 641. 
194.  Id.   
195.  Id. 
196.  Id.  
197.  See ARITOTLE, supra note 12, at 96 (defining “aristocracy” as “[rule] of the few (but 
of more than one person) is called aristocracy—either because the best persons are ruling, or 
because they are ruling with a view to what is best for the city and those who participate in it . . . 
.”). 
198.  DUBOIS, supra note 238, at 641. 
  
whites accepted “their subordination to the slaveholders, and looked for escape from their 
condition only to the possibility of becoming slaveholders themselves.199  Education was 
“regarded as a luxury connected with wealth.”200  The concept of education as a luxury good 
may seem foreign to our modern understandings.201  Implicit to the current constitutional 
doctrine that education is not a fundamental right is a belief that even if education is important, it 
is something that people should find for themselves if they have the means.  This again harkens 
to a view of education that is inconsistent with modern views of democratic participation and 
governance.  In this case, the education limitation appears to follow Rousseau’s view that certain 
forms of occupation were incompatible with the ability for self-governance and full education.202   
According to DuBois, “[i]t was only the other part of the laboring class, the black folk, 
who connected knowledge with power; who believed that education was the stepping-stone to 
wealth and respect, and that wealth, without education, was crippled.”203  Southern public 
schools owe their existence to the triumph of the North, the legitimizing of what began in the 
pre-Civil War South as clandestine African American schools, and the post-Civil War Freedman 
Bureau’s sponsorship of mixed and segregated public schools.204  These schools, founded after 
the emancipation of the slaves, were the foundation for the creation of public schools throughout 
                                                 
 
199.  Id.  
 200.  Id.  
201.  Id. at 665-66. 
202.  See ROUSSEAU, supra note 100. 
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the South.205   
Despite the Southern whites early and general disdain for public education, southern state 
constitutions came to embody, at least on paper, a progressive approach to education.206  Some 
states mandated systems of free, racially mixed, public schools.207  Some even went so far as to 
create a duty for the legislature to construct a system of free, public education for children up to 
the age of 21.208  
Animating much of this was the previously-described recognition by the newly freed 
women and men that education was the path to full constitutional personhood, to full human 
dignity.209  DuBois recognized that early on local control was the enemy of educational progress, 
explaining that “wherever there was retrogression, particularly in Negro schools, it can be traced 
to the increased power of the county and district administrators.”210   African Americans and 
their northern allies who helped fund these education reforms recognized the connection between 
education and any meaningful conception of liberation.211   
                                                 
 
205.  Id. at 664. 
206.  Id. at 665. 
207.  Id. at 637-669. 
208.  Id.  
209.  Id. at 639, 664-65. 
210.  Id. at 665. 
211.  Id. 
  
2. The U.S. Supreme Court Revised its Rights Doctrine because of Education’s 
Importance 
 
Finally, in the rightly famous Brown v. Board of Education case,212 a Court that was 
reluctant to end segregation in other contexts nonetheless found that education was so especially 
important that segregation was not just morally wrong, but contrary to America’s foundational 
law, the U.S. Constitution.213  This recognition in the context of education laid the foundation for 
later holdings that racial segregation was unconstitutional in other contexts.214  It is noteworthy 
that the end of segregation and “separate but equal” began with an education case.215 
Despite obviously significant examples of the publicly-recognized social, political, and 
legal significance of education, the U.S. Supreme Court has retreated from its doctrinal 
recognition that education is especially important. 216  The Court has instead embraced a 
confused conception of liberty over the duty to provide public education.  Donald Lively argues 
                                                 
 
212.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
213.  See U.S. CONST.; Katherine Tonnas, The Legacy of Brown v. Board of Education, 
51 LA. B.J. 346 (2004).  
214.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  See also Tonnas, supra note 267,. 
215.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
216.  Greenspahn, supra note 228.  Greenspahn argues that Brown clearly recognized the 
fundamental right to education.  Id. at 762.  But the Court has retreated from the promise of 
Brown.  Id. at 772.  Greenspahn suggests that San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973) does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a right to public education.  Id. at 
768.  However, Greenspan acknowledges that litigating for a fundamental right to education 
would be useless because of the current Court’s reluctance to add rights.  Id. at 783. 
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that Brown was a good starting point for equal protection, but recognizes that the Court’s 
subsequent failure to clearly define equality has led to the trampling of minority rights.217  Lively 
states:  
Absent an explicit command to actuate the equal protection guarantee in 
comprehensive and substantive fashion, it is not surprising that the provision has 
demonstrated limited utility in vindicating minority interests.  Born of limited 
aims and aspirations and crafted by a culturally homogeneous group, much like 
the Constitution’s original provisions, the fourteenth amendment reflected the 
influence of white superiority.  The result was a fundamental but qualified 
demand for racial equality limited to contract and property rights, individual 
security and legal status.218   
 
Education was important to the newly freed slaves and several bills were passed to ensure 
that education was made available to them.219   Goodwin Liu explains that the Freedmen’s 
Bureau and its education bills were enacted pursuant the newly-enacted Fourteenth 
Amendment’s creation of national citizenship.220  National citizenship had not previously existed 
in a clear and obvious fashion under the Constitution.221  With the creation of national citizenship 
came a new responsibility to “extend educational opportunity to all children.”222  The 
                                                 
 
217.  Lively, supra note 228. 
218.  Id. at 486-487.  
219.  Liu, supra note 221, at 335 (arguing that the federal government has a constitutional 
duty to ensure that every child has the opportunity to receive an education); DUBOIS, supra note 
238, at 637-69. 
220.  Liu, supra note 221, at 335. 
221.  Id. at 339. 
222.  Id. 
  
Freedmen’s Bureau’s creation and charges were a legislative recognition by the U.S. Congress of 
their duty under the Constitution to “enforce and give substance to the guarantee of American 
citizenship” that was granted in the Fourteenth Amendment.223  As Liu notes, “guided by a 
national standard of literacy for effective citizenship, the proposals envisioned a distribution of 
aid that would lessen educational inequality across states.”224 
B. Liberal Theories of Equality Effectively Abandon Equality as a Viable Principle of Justice 
The primary weakness of the Equal Protection Clause as the Court is currently 
interpreting it, is that rights may be violated, so long as they are violated equally.  Such a 
definition of equality is obviously problematic.  As a matter of constitutional doctrine, it  
effectively resurrect a theory of equality that was the foundation for the infamous “separate but 
equal” doctrine.225  Plessy v. Ferguson226 and The Civil Rights Cases227 narrowly construed the 
equality principle embedded within the equal protection clause to be limited to liberal equality.228  
Together these cases served to limit the possibilities of the Fourteenth Amendment 
generally.229  Of particular relevance here is that these cases completely undermined the central 
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equality concerns that inspired passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.230  Those concerns were 
to further racial equality and to end institutionalized white supremacy in the form of legally 
sanctioned slavery as well as the American racial caste system.231   
 As William Julius Wilson notes, the Court’s retrograde concept of liberal equality232 is 
limited in that this concept of equality leaves out considerations of historical context, but instead 
focuses almost exclusively on treating people identically.233  The sameness standard of liberal 
                                                 
 
230.  See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil 
Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2006). 
231.  Id. 
232.  William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged, in 
THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 461-479 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., Brookings 1991) 
(criticizes the concept of colorblindness for not appealing to the reasons why minorities are poor 
to begin with).  See also Charles R. Lawrence III,The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that color-blindness 
as advocated by classical liberals, who also use the term “formal equality,” is flawed due to the 
fact that liberal conception of equality through color-blindness does not take into account 
unconscious racism); Barbara Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See:” White Race Consciousness 
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993) (arguing that 
colorblindness fails, which is why liberal conception of equality also fails).  
233.  See Richard Delgado, Introduction to Critical Race Theory, in CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). 
  
equality does not appreciate or adjust to concepts of social hierarchy or historical context.234  
Under such an ahistorical approach, a law that mandates separate facilities based solely on race is 
not necessarily furthering inequality unless it can be shown that the quality of those facilities are 
themselves unequal.235  The social hierarchy that such a law reinforces is ignored.  This liberal 
construction of the equality principle was applied for over half a century in the form of the 
infamous, separate but equal doctrine to validate segregation laws as consistent with the principle 
of equality so long as the facilities were “equal.”236  
The decisions in these cases flowed not from some outdated academic exercise that 
yielded unintentionally unjust results.  The Reconstruction Era Court’s members were 
contemporaries of the Civil War Amendments’ framers and therefore had every reason to be 
fully aware of the context of racial oppression, exclusion, and white supremacy that together 
those amendments were meant to address.237  Yet, the Court chose to ignore the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in order to weaken the scope of what ought to have been broad 
protective powers to further a uniquely American conception of equality.238   
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Today’s Supreme Court is in the process of reverting to Jim Crow Era constructions of 
“equality” and therefore abandoned “equality” as a viable principle of justice.239  The Court’s 
holdings in Rodriguez and later in Milliken v. Bradley demonstrate a transparent avoidance if not 
outright abandonment of the principle of equality.240  These cases more closely resemble Plessy’s 
doctrine of “separate but equal” than Brown and Brown’s progeny’s conclusion that separate is 
inherently unequal.241 
Absent robust protection of a right to high quality public education, minority and 
economically disadvantaged children will have no recourse as the quality of their education 
continues to erode.242  The previously referenced data and research demonstrates that the average 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Democracy and the Potentials for Elitist and Neutral Anti-Democracy, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
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239.  See Klarman, supra note 292, at304-05; Roy L. Brooks, American Democracy and 
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CHALLENGES 1, 11 (2005). 
240.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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quality of American education has fallen sharply.243  Minority and economically disadvantaged 
children as a group, however, underperform even this already low and plummeting U.S. 
average.244 
According to Julius Chambers, schools that predominantly serve non-white children are 
underfunded in comparison to majority white public schools.245  These funding differences have 
been argued to be contributing factors in the overall performance gap between students 
graduating from majority white versus majority non-white public schools.246  Similarly, schools 
in impoverished and working class communities tend to be significantly underfunded compared 
to more economically privileged public schools.247  Here again, these funding differences have 
also been argued to be contributing factors to the overall performance gap between students 
graduating from public schools in economically privileged  communities.248  If there is currently 
a general U.S. education crisis, then the education situation for racial and ethnic minorities and 
working class children who as a group receive an even worse than average education is nearing a 
state of complete dysfunction.   
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The decisions in these cases were not merely the result of some unintentional confusion 
regarding how best to define equality.249  Much like the Reconstruction Era Court, which issued 
contextually inconsistent and racially hostile rulings that effectively bolster what has been 
referred to alternatively as a racial caste system or system of white supremacy, so too, the 
modern Court has chosen to ignore the lessons from Brown: that Fourteenth Amendment 
equality means more than just identical but separate facilities.250  Equality connects with the 
Preamble’s acclamation to form “a more perfect Union.”251  The Supreme Court has all but 
abandoned the principle of equality as a viable principle of justice in the education context.252    
IV. PROTECTING HUMAN DIGNITY VIA THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
An alternative approach for recognizing a right to public education, based instead in a 
due process clause analysis, would allow us to overcome the current Court’s libertarian bias and 
equal protection clause limitations.  The seeds of a new, expanded due process clause approach 
can be found in Lawrence v. Texas, where the majority recognized a liberty interest in human 
dignity.253  Lawrence ultimately expanded the scope for protecting the right to privacy by way of 
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a human dignity-based argument.254  Lawrence broadened the right to privacy to protect the 
liberty to privately engage in intimate sexual relations based on the recognition that liberty is an 
essential to human dignity.255  Hence, Lawrence agrees with the long held view that liberty is an 
essential component to human dignity.256   
An advantage to framing the education rights concern in terms of human dignity is that 
human dignity is necessarily defined as an evolving standard that is inherently contextual as to 
time and circumstances.257  Thus, a human dignity-based analysis has the potential for 
overcoming the current limits of the Equal Protection Clause analysis by inserting a contextual 
component that is universally applicable.258 
The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses are both central to our fundamental rights 
doctrine.259  The Equal Protection Clause analysis of fundamental rights is primarily used to 
protect people from being selectively deprived of their fundamental rights.260  The Due Process 
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Clause analysis is primarily concerned with whether a right even exists.261  One component of 
the San Antonio v. Rodriguez analysis was a Due Process Clause determination that education is 
not a fundamental right.262   
Kenji Yoshino suggests that in Rodriguez, the Court conducted an equality-based due 
process clause analysis that focused squarely on the fundamentality of the right to public 
education and on wealth as a suspect classification.263  While the Court has consistently avoided 
identifying wealth as a separate suspect classification,264 as Yoshino notes, the Court has in other 
contexts found ways to protect the impoverished by applying its liberty-based analyses to protect 
against blatant forms of discrimination.265   
A. Xenophobia Animates Modern Judicial Abandonment of Equal Protection 
Kenji Yoshino suggests that rather than directly acknowledging the racial, ethnic, and 
other group based inequalities in education and other areas, the Court prefers to avoid finding an 
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Equal Protection Clause concern.266  For Yoshino, the solution to this avoidance of the Equal 
Protection clause is to instead frame inequality concerns in terms that universalize the 
application of a liberty interest and in so doing obscure any group based inequalities and 
subordination concerns.267  Obscuring the subordination aspects of such cases is among the 
purported advantages of a liberty based dignity approach.268  This Article joins Yoshino in 
endorsing a dignity-based due process clause analysis.269  However, obscuring the truth is rarely 
if ever advantageous, especially when dealing with matters of justice.270 
Yoshino’s human dignity approach suffers from at least two problems.  First, it frames 
the central animating concerns regarding Equal Protection in terms of the seemingly benign 
concept of “pluralism anxiety,” 271 which obscures what truly animates the decreasing 
effectiveness of the Equal Protection jurisprudence.  The misleading characterization of 
pluralism anxiety bleeds into the second problem, which is Yoshino’s failure to appreciate that 
civil rights advocates, particularly education rights advocates, have long been pioneers in 
framing equality concerns using the universalist concept of civil liberties.272   In fact, the 
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infamous Rodriguez case is actually an emblematic example of advocates applying liberty-based 
arguments to what could also have been framed as an equality concern.  Despite applying this 
universalist approach, the court still failed to recognize a fundamental right to public 
education.273 
Regarding the first problem, Yoshino’s concept of “pluralism anxiety,” is premised on 
alleviating what he terms as a post-Warren Court, “pluralism anxiety,” which he defines as 
“apprehension of and about [America’s] demographic diversity.”274  He sees this anxiety as 
flowing from the legal recognition of “‘new’ kinds of people and ‘newly visible’ kinds of 
people.”275  Pluralism anxiety is a new, euphemistic umbrella term for concepts that are all too 
familiar.  Where the “new” or “newly visible” are people with different national origins, such a 
fear is typically described as xenophobia.276  Where those people are non-whites, such a fear is 
called racism.277  Where the “newly visible” are women, then the fear is called sexism.278  Where 
the “new” or “newly visible” are gay, lesbian, bi-sexual, or transgendered, the fear is called 
homophobia.  “Fear of outsiders” or “fear of the other” is what Yoshino’s “pluralism anxiety” is 
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truly describing.279  Framed thusly, Yoshino’s observation is nothing new or controversial.  
Using the term “pluralism anxiety” is problematic because it appears to white-wash foul views, 
implicitly validating what is a disturbingly retrograde influence on American jurisprudence.  The 
term “xenophobia” more fully captures the concerns and motivations than the neutral sounding 
and potentially misleading term “pluralism anxiety.”  
 Xenophobia under the classical definition of the term is etymologically the more 
appropriate umbrella term for encapsulating these fears or “anxieties” because, despite its more 
limited English language definition, its Greek roots literally mean fear of strangers, foreigners, or 
in short, “fear of outsiders.”280  Xenophobia, used as a term to summarize this fear of outsiders, 
crystallizes the value of human dignity as a counterbalance.  Any fear that “we,” who view 
ourselves as insiders, will lose power and privilege by fully dignifying the presence of outsiders, 
can be countered by recognition that we and the outsiders are all human beings who have a 
shared right to human dignity.281   
The second concern that Yoshino introduces the universal concept of human dignity 
without acknowledging that civil rights advocates have long been dealing with a xenophobia-
inspired, post-Brown jurisprudence by consciously invoking universalist themes, such as a right 
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to public education.282  What appears to be lost is what once upon a time was obvious.  The term 
“civil rights” itself embodies a universalist theme that is meant to resound beyond the limiting 
and frequently dismissible confines of racial equality.283  Use of “civil rights” as a term is meant 
to elevate these concerns for inclusion within the broader inclusive arena of American civil 
liberties.284  Far from embracing a paradigm of difference, as Yoshino indicates, civil rights 
advocates have consistently sought to universalize the struggle for civil rights and equality.285  
Yoshino’s approach to overcoming xenophobia’s retrograde influence on equality fails to 
appreciate the sophistication of civil rights advocates and thus mischaracterizes the scope of the 
equality concerns,286 while exaggerating the liberty potential, especially in the context of public 
                                                 
 
282.  Compare Yoshino, supra note 22, at 794 (arguing that application of a dignity-
based approach would help overcome Rodriguez by approaching education issues not as issues 
of equality, but as an issue regarding a due process clause-based right to public education). 
283.  
284.  See LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL 
RIGHTS READER (2d ed. 1995).  
285.  See JESSE L. JACKSON, JR. & FRANK E. WATKINS, A MORE PERFECT UNION: 
ADVANCING NEW AMERICAN RIGHTS 330 (2001) (arguing for a proposed constitutional 
amendment guaranteeing to all citizens the right to a high-quality public education); Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Speech at the March on Washington: I Have a Dream (August 28, 1963), 
available at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf . 
286.  See Yoshino, supra  note 22, at 751. 
  
education.287 
Race and ethnicity have long been problematic to invoke directly; this is why the 
Rodriguez plaintiffs couched what was clearly an issue of Mexican-American school children 
being denied equal educational opportunities as a question of liberty: their freedom to obtain a 
public education.288  The plaintiffs went a step further in providing an opportunity for the Court 
to avoid xenophobia concerns.289  They addressed the inequality aspects alternatively, in terms of 
wealth-based inequality, thus giving the Court the option of avoiding the more inflammatory 
xenophobic concerns regarding race and ethnicity.290  Yet, the Rodriguez Court failed to 
recognize either a right to public education, or that this form of obvious and systemic 
subordination of the children of the less fortunate violated either equality or due process.291  
Rodriguez is just one of many examples of where sophisticated civil rights advocates were 
                                                 
 
287.  Id. at 794 (arguing that application of a dignity-based approach would help 
overcome Rodriguez by approaching education issues not as issues of equality, but as issues 
regarding a right to public education).   
288.  Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What Lawrence Brought for “Show and Tell:” The Non-
Fundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally Adequate Education, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
343, 368 (2005); R. Craig Wood, Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance 
Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to Adequacy, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 531, 535 
(2004). 
289.  Yoshino, supra note 22, at 751. 
290.  Id. 
291.  See Brunell, supra note 345, at 353-54. 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
EDUCATION RIGHTS AND THE NEW DUE PROCESS, 47 Ind. L. Rev. __ (Forthcoming 2014). 
 
thwarted in their creative attempts to apply universalist themes to class specific inequalities.292     
Despite these weaknesses within Yoshino’s human dignity-based liberty approach, this 
approach may still be helpful in furthering a right to public education.   
B. Human Dignity as a Proxy for Education Rights 
The Court’s failure to recognize a fundamental right to public education does not 
necessarily foreclose the possibility that access to a high quality, public education can be 
protected as a component to human dignity.  A human dignity-based due process clause analysis 
could be applied as a vehicle to affect a right to public education. This approach would be similar 
to the Court’s application of the fundamental right to privacy as a vehicle for recognizing other 
important rights, including women’s reproductive rights.293  More recently, the Court applied its 
a dignity-based due process clause analysis to use the constitutional right to privacy to protect 
the rights of homosexuals by protecting a broader right to intimate sexual relations.294   
Lawrence broadened the right to privacy to protect the liberty to privately engage in 
intimate sexual relations based on the recognition that liberty is essential to human dignity.295  
Hence, Lawrence agrees with the long held view that liberty is an essential component to human 
dignity.  The case for applying a dignity-based due process clause protection of the right to 
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public education is even stronger for education than for the right to privacy.  This is because, 
unlike the right to privacy, education is essential to both the liberty component and to the 
democracy component of human dignity. 
Treating access to high-quality public education as a component to a fundamental right to 
human dignity would fit well within already existing U.S. constitutional law doctrine.  Human 
dignity has already been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as fundamental to American 
concepts of liberty and equality.  Human dignity has already been applied by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a vehicle for protecting other rights, most notably, the right to privacy.296   
The right to privacy has since been applied to add universal character to subordination 
critiques involving women and homosexuals.  The right to dignity’s potential to universalize 
rights, avoids Yoshino’s xenophobia concerns.  For as Lawrence demonstrates, when the Court 
has been willing to correct for obvious inequalities, it would rather “universalize” rights rather 
than confront the xenophobia-based fears that would come from recognizing a new suspect 
classification.  However, the goal is not to placate xenophobia but to overcome it.   
Given that Lawrence applied dignity to interpret and expand the extra-textual but yet 
judicially recognized fundamental constitutional right to privacy, this opens the door to finding 
other dignity-based due process clause rights, including the right to public education.297  
Obviously, the right to privacy is a negative right or liberty that fits squarely within the current 
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Court’s negative rights biased, libertarian perspective as elucidated in The Fifth Freedom.298  
However, Lawrence’s application of dignity, with its attendant positive rights implications 
regarding ensuring opportunity to achieve basic and essential human achievements,299 
demonstrates the falsehood of the negative and positive rights dichotomy.300  Applying the 
concept of human dignity to interpret a due process clause based right, helps expose the true 
connection between duty and freedom as well as the connection between democracy and liberty.   
CONCLUSION 
Education is essential to human dignity because education is essential to the two 
fundamental components to human dignity: liberty and democracy.  Despite the importance of 
education to liberty and democracy, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to recognize education 
                                                 
 
298.  Imoukhuede, supra note 1, at 81. 
299.  SEN, supra note 15, at 4-5, 10-11, 36-49, 144 (arguing for basic capabilities that 
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private interests against government programs that promote racial equality sets up a false 
dichotomy between private choices on the one hand and government action on the other.”).   
  
as a fundamental right or even to consistently protect against blatant inequalities in access to and 
quality of public education.  However, the Court’s human dignity jurisprudence opens a 
possibility for recognizing a right to public education by way of a dignity-based due process 
clause analysis.   
Lawrence v. Texas has expanded the scope for protecting the right to privacy through a 
human dignity-based argument that privacy is essential to liberty and liberty is essential to 
dignity.  The case for a human dignity-based recognition of the right to public education is even 
stronger for education than for the right to privacy.  This is because, unlike the right to privacy, 
education is essential to both the liberty and the democracy components of human dignity.   
The Court’s continuing failure to recognize and protect the right to education undermines 
liberty and jeopardizes the very foundation of American democracy.  Without equal and fair 
access to education, liberty becomes meaningless and democracy an empty concept capable of 
immediate devolution into aristocracy or plutocracy.  
Applying this analysis in the context of public education would be a significant step 
towards unhinging our constitutional doctrine from the false rights dichotomy inherent in the 
current Court’s libertarian and anti-equality bias.  Today, education is once again specially 
situated as the bridge for overcoming separate but equal styled inequality, just as it did before in 
Brown v. Board of Education.   
The positive right of access to public education will require a new form of constitutional 
analysis under the due process clause if it is to be recognized and meaningfully enforced.  This 
new due process would be based in a human dignity jurisprudence301 that applies the insights 
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from the capabilities approach pioneered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.302  The 
mechanics of this new due process will need to be further developed, but it promises to have 
ramifications well beyond the education rights context.  Applying this new due process could 
finally lead to meaningful recognition and enforcement of government’s other fundamental 
duties or positive rights.   
Government has a duty to act, if for no other purpose than to preserve human dignity.  
Education is essential to human dignity and a duty for government to provide equal access to a 
high quality, public education can and should be enforced by way of a dignity-based due process 
clause analysis.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
approaches to reaching it, including negative and positive rights theories). 
302.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 17-18.  According to Nussbaum: 
“Capability Approach” and “Capabilities Approach” are the key terms in 
the political/economic program Sen proposes in works such as Inequality 
Reexamined and Development as Freedom, where the project is to commend the 
capability framework as the best space within which to make comparisons of life 
quality, and to show why it is superior to utilitarian and quasi-Rawlsian 
approaches.  
